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The TRIPS Agreement and WTO Dispute Settlement:  
Past, Present and Future 
Peter Van den Bossche1 
Introduction 
In 2020, the WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (‘TRIPS 
Agreement’) marked its 25th anniversary. There was, however, little reason for celebration. The COVID-
19 pandemic had plunged the world economy in an unprecedented crisis. In April 2020, the IMF 
predicted that global GDP would contract by as much as 3 per cent in 2020,2 and the WTO forecasted that 
the volume of world trade would decline in 2020 between 13 and 32 per cent depending on the how long 
the health crisis would last and how governments would respond to the economic impact of the crisis.3 
Even the decline under the best-case ‘13 per cent’ scenario would still be the steepest decline on record.4 
However, global trade and the multilateral trading system, of which the TRIPS Agreement is one of the 
pillars, was in crisis already before any of us had heard of the new corona virus or considered ‘social 
distancing’ a civil duty (rather than deviant behavior). Global trade in goods declined in 2019 by 3 per 
cent in value terms and global trade in commercial services grew by a paltry 2 per cent only.5 In its latest 
Report on Trade and Investment Barriers, the European Commission found that in 2019 the overall 
number of trade barriers kept increasing and noted that ‘protectionism has become ingrained in trade 
relations with many partners’.6 There are multiple causes for this development in international trade but 
the dramatic shift in the trade policy of the United States since 2017 has arguable been the most important 
among these causes. The multilateral trading system and its principal institution, the WTO, have been for 
almost for almost four years now under direct attack from the United States, which under the Trump 
Administration evolved from the ‘champion’ of the system to its ‘demolisher-in-chief’. Since Donald 
Trump assumed the US presidency in January 2017, populist economic nationalism and protectionism 
have become the main features of US trade policy. The benefits for the United States of a rules-based 
multilateral trading system and of membership of the WTO have been openly and repeatedly questioned 
by both President Trump and members of the US Congress.7 Among the most destructive actions taken by 
the United States against the rules-based multilateral trading system and the WTO is its frontal attack 
against the WTO dispute settlement system and in particular appellate review under the system by the 
WTO Appellate Body. As a result of the US obstruction of the appointment of new Appellate Body 
judges, the Appellate Body is since December 2019 paralysed and the WTO dispute settlement system 
seriously undermined. In this chapter, we will examine: (1) the core features of the WTO dispute 
settlement system; (2) the performance of the WTO dispute settlement system in TRIPS disputes; (3) the 
                                                            
1 Professor of International Economic Law and Director of Studies, World Trade Institute (WTI), University of Bern, 
Switzerland; President of the Society of International Economic Law (SIEL); and former Chair and Member of the Appellate 
Body of the World Trade Organization (2009-2019). 
2 See https://blogs.imf.org/2020/04/14/the-great-lockdown-worst-economic-downturn-since-the-great-depression/. In May 
2020, the World Bank predicted a contraction of global GDP in 2020 of 5.2 per cent. See 
https://www.worldbank.org/en/publication/global-economic-prospects. 
3 See https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres20_e/pr855_e.htm.  
4 In June 2020, the WTO estimated that the 2020 decline in global trade was ‘unlikely’ to reach the worst-case ‘32 per cent’ 
scenario projected in April 2020. See https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres20_e/pr858_e.htm.  
5 See https://timeseries.wto.org.  
6 See European Commission, Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on Trade and 
Investment Barriers, 1 January 2019 – 31 December 2019, COM(2020) 236 final, dated 15 June 2020. 
7 See e.g. https://www.cnbc.com/2018/08/30/trump-threatens-to-withdraw-from-world-trade-organization.html (on President 
Trump’s statement that the US would withdraw from WTO if it ‘did not shape up’); and  
https://www.hawley.senate.gov/senator-hawley-introduces-joint-resolution-withdraw-wto (on the joint resolution to withdraw 
from the WTO introduced by Senator Josh Hawley). 
 
         
current crisis of WTO dispute settlement; and (4) the impact of that crisis on the application and 
enforcement of the TRIPS Agreement. 
The WTO Dispute Settlement 
The establishment of the WTO in January 1995, as a result of the successful conclusion of the Uruguay 
Round negotiations (1986-1993), has been considered ‘the most dramatic advance in multilateralism since 
the inspired period of institution building in the late 1940s’. 8 Together with the establishment of the 
WTO, also new and/or stronger multilateral rules on trade in goods and services and on the protection of 
intellectual property were adopted. The singular most important achievement of the Uruguay Round 
negotiations was, however, the creation now a new two-stage system for compulsory and binding dispute 
settlement, provided for in the Understanding on Rules and Procedures for the Settlement of Disputes, 
commonly referred to as the Dispute Settlement Understanding or DSU, attached to the WTO Agreement 
as Annex 2. The DSU is to ensure the compliance and, if necessary, enforce compliance, of WTO 
Members with their obligations under WTO law, including the obligations under the TRIPS Agreement. 
In fact, the possibility of ensuring compliance with the TRIPS Agreement through WTO dispute 
settlement was considered a major step forward in international intellectual property law and an important 
reason for making the TRIPS Agreement part of WTO law. 
The WTO dispute settlement system is based on the dispute settlement system of the1947 General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (‘GATT 1947’). The latter system evolved between the late 1940s and 
the early 1990s from a system that was primarily a power-based system of dispute resolution through 
diplomatic negotiations, into a rules-based system of dispute resolution through adjudication. The WTO 
dispute settlement system is a further leap forward in the process of progressive ‘judicialisation’ of the 
resolution of international trade disputes. As discussed below, since January 1995, the WTO dispute 
settlement system has been widely used and its ‘output’, in terms of the number of dispute settlement 
reports, has been remarkable. Both developed- and developing-country Members have frequently used the 
system to resolve their trade disputes, including disputes on politically very sensitive issues.  
The jurisdiction of the WTO dispute settlement system is compulsory, exclusive and contentious in 
nature. Furthermore, it is very broad in scope. It covers disputes arising under all but two WTO 
agreements, including the TRIPS Agreement.9  In principle, any act or omission attributable to a WTO 
Member can be a measure that is subject to WTO dispute settlement. Note that measures that can be 
subject to WTO dispute settlement include action or conduct by private parties attributable to a Member; 
measures that expired or were withdrawn during the proceedings and are thus no longer in force; 
legislation as such (as opposed to the actual application of this legislation in specific instances); unwritten 
norms or rules of Members, including practices or policies which are not set out in law; and measures by 
regional and local authorities. Access to the WTO dispute settlement system is limited to WTO Members. 
A WTO Member can have recourse to the system when it claims that a benefit accruing to it under one of 
the covered agreements is being nullified or impaired (Article 3.1, 26 DSU and Article XXIII of the 
GATT 1994). A complainant will almost always argue that the respondent violated a provision of WTO 
law and file a violation complaint. If the violation is shown, there is a presumption of nullification or 
impairment of a benefit (Article 3.8 DSU). Alternatively, but never done with success to date, a 
complainant can file a non-violation complaint and claim that a benefit accruing to it is being nullified or 
impaired as a result of the application by a Member of any measure, whether or not it conflicts with any 
provision of WTO law. Note, however, that no non-violation complaints can be brought under the TRIPS 
Agreement.10 Non-governmental organisations, industry associations, companies or individuals have no 
                                                            
8 See Report of the Consultative Board to the Director-General Supachai Panitchpakdi, The Future of the WTO: Addressing 
Institutional Challenges in the New Millennium (‘Sutherland Report’) (WTO,2004), para. 1. 
9 Only disputes arising under the Trade Policy Review Mechanism and the plurilateral Agreement on Trade in Civil Aircraft do 
not fall within the jurisdiction of the WTO dispute settlement system. See Appendix 1 DSU. 
10 There was strong resistance from developing countries during the Uruguay Round negotiations against inclusion of non-
violation complaints as a cause of action under the TRIPS Agreement, as they were concerned that this would create the 
 
         
direct access to the WTO dispute settlement system. However, disputes, including TRIPS disputes, are 
usually brought to the WTO for resolution at the instigation of companies and industry associations. They 
lobby their (or a) government to initiate WTO dispute settlement proceedings and can thus be said to have 
‘indirect access’ to the system. 
The prime objectives of the WTO dispute settlement system are to provide security and predictability to 
the multilateral trading system (Article 3.2 DSU) and to settle disputes between WTO Members promptly 
(Article 3.3 DSU). WTO dispute settlement has six key features, which in addition to the compulsory and 
exclusive jurisdiction of the WTO dispute settlement system and the process of WTO dispute settlement 
contribute to, and explain, the importance and success of WTO dispute settlement to date discussed 
below. Some of these features set apart the WTO dispute settlement system from other international 
dispute settlement mechanisms. These features also may offer an explanation for the use made of the 
WTO dispute settlement system for the resolution of TRIPS disputes.  First, the WTO dispute settlement 
system is a single, comprehensive and integrated dispute settlement system. The rules of the DSU apply 
to all disputes arising under the covered agreements (Article 1.1 DSU). Article 64.1 of the TRIPS 
Agreement explicitly confirms that the DSU applies to any TRIPS dispute. A number of these covered 
agreements, including the TRIPS Agreement, provide, however, for some special and additional rules and 
procedures ‘designed to deal with the particularities of dispute settlement relating to obligations arising 
under a specific covered agreement’ (Article 1.2 and Appendix 2 DSU). An example of such special and 
differential rule is the exclusion, already noted above, of non-violation complaints in TRIPS disputes 
(Article 64.2 and 3 of the TRIPS Agreement). Second, the DSU provides for several methods to settle 
disputes between WTO Members: consultations or negotiations (Article 4 DSU); adjudication by panels 
and the Appellate Body (Articles 6–20 DSU); arbitration (Articles 21.3(c), 22.6 and 25 DSU); and good 
offices, conciliation and mediation (Article 5 DSU). Of these methods, arbitration under Article 25 and 
good offices, conciliation and mediation under Article 5 have only played a marginal role. In all WTO 
disputes, including TRIPS disputes, Members had recourse to consultations (Article 4 DSU), and, if those 
were unsuccessful, adjudication (Articles 6 to 19 DSU). As discussed below, however, some WTO 
Members are currently resorting to arbitration under Article 25 to address the current crisis of WTO 
dispute settlement. Third, pursuant to Article 23 DSU, Members must settle disputes with other Members 
over compliance with WTO obligations through the multilateral procedures DSU, rather than through 
unilateral action. Concerns regarding unilateral action taken by the United States in the late 1980s and 
early 1990s, also in disputes regarding the protection of intellectual property rights, were the driving force 
behind the Uruguay Round negotiations on dispute settlement, which eventually resulted in the DSU. The 
recent return of the United States to unilateral action is at the core of the current crisis of the WTO 
dispute settlement system. Fourth, the WTO dispute settlement system prefers Members to resolve a 
dispute through consultations, resulting in a mutually acceptable solution, rather than through 
adjudication (Article 3.7 DSU). In other words, the DSU prefers parties not to go to court, but to settle 
their dispute amicably out of court. As discussed below, a high number of TRIPS disputes is resolved 
through consultations and does not proceed to the adjudication stage of the WTO dispute settlement 
system. Fifth, the WTO dispute settlement system serves not only ‘to preserve the rights and obligations 
of Members under the covered agreements’, but also ‘to clarify the existing provisions of those 
agreements’ (Article 3.2, second sentence, DSU). The scope and nature of this clarification mandate is, 
however, explicitly circumscribed. Panels and the Appellate Body are precluded from adding to or 
diminishing the rights and obligations of Members (Article 3.2, last sentence and 19.2 DSU). The DSU 
does not condone judicial activism. For panels and the Appellate Body to stay within their mandate to 
clarify existing provisions and not stray into judicial activism, it is therefore important that they interpret 
and apply the provisions concerned correctly, i.e. in accordance with customary rules of interpretation of 
international law, as codified in Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
                                                            
possibility to extend the protection of the TRIPS Agreement beyond that specified in its provisions. For this reason, Article 
64.2 of the TRIPS Agreement provided that, for a period of five years from the entry into force of the WTO Agreement, no non-
violation complaints could be brought under the TRIPS Agreement. This ‘moratorium’ has been extended multiple times and 
still applies today, as Members have been unable to agree, pursuant to Article 64.3 of the TRIPS Agreement, on the scope and 
modalities for non-violation complaints. 
 
         
(Article 3.2, second sentence, DSU).11 As discussed below, at the very heart of the current crisis of WTO 
dispute settlement is the criticism of the United States that the WTO Appellate Body engaged in judicial 
activism and, through erroneous interpretation of the WTO agreements, added obligations to which the 
United States never agreed. Sixth, the DSU provides for three types of remedy for breach of WTO law: 
one final remedy, namely, the withdrawal (or modification) of the WTO-inconsistent measure; and two 
temporary remedies which can be applied awaiting the withdrawal (or modification) of the WTO-
inconsistent measure, namely, compensation and suspension of concessions or other obligations 
(commonly referred to as ‘retaliation’) (Article 3.7, 21 and 22 DSU) . A measure which was found to be 
WTO-inconsistent must be withdrawn immediately or, if that is impracticable, within a ‘reasonable period 
of time’. However, when the offending party fails to do so, and the parties are subsequently unable to 
agree on compensation for the harm that will result from the lack of compliance, the original complaining 
party may request authorisation from the DSB to retaliate against the offending party by suspending 
concessions or other obligations with respect to that offending party. Retaliation, often in the form of a 
drastic increase in the customs duties on strategically selected products, puts economic and political 
pressure on the offending party to withdraw (or modify) its WTO-inconsistent measure(s). Subject to 
certain conditions, the retaliation may take the form of the suspension of obligations under agreements 
other than those with regard to which a violation was found in the underlying dispute (i.e. cross-
retaliation). Note that in a number of disputes which did not relate to the TRIPS Agreement, the 
complainant was authorized to retaliate against the non-complaining respondent by suspending 
obligations under the TRIPS Agreement.12 To date, Members applied retaliation measures in only four 
cases, while the number of disputes in which the DSB authorised Members to do so was significantly 
higher. The effectiveness and/or appropriateness of retaliation – which is by definition trade destructive – 
as a temporary remedy for breach of WTO law is the subject of debate. 
Among the institutions involved in WTO dispute settlement one must distinguish between a political 
institution, the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB), and two independent, judicial-type institutions, the 
dispute settlement panels and the Appellate Body. The DSB, which is composed of all WTO Members, 
administers the dispute settlement system (Article 2 DSU). It has the authority to establish panels, adopt 
panel and Appellate Body reports, and authorise retaliation in case of non-compliance (Article 6.1,16.4, 
1714 and 22.6 DSU). It takes decisions on these important matters by reverse consensus.13 As a result, the 
DSB decisions on these matters are quasi-automatic. However, on all other matters, including the (re-
)appointment of Appellate Body judges, the DSB takes decisions by consensus and each Member thus has 
a veto right (Article 2.4 DSU). As explained below, this consensus requirement was resulted on the 
paralysis of the Appellate Body since December 2019.14 Notwithstanding its importance in WTO dispute 
settlement, the actual adjudication of disputes brought to the WTO is not done by the DSB, but done, at 
the first-instance level, by dispute settlement panels and, at the appellate level, by the Appellate Body. 
Panels are ad hoc bodies established for the purpose of adjudicating a particular dispute and are dissolved 
once they have accomplished this task. A panel is established by the DSB but the parties decide on the 
composition of the panel by mutual accord. If they fail to do so within twenty days after the establishment 
of the panel, either party can ask the Director-General of the WTO to appoint the panellists (Article 8.7 
DSU). As a rule, panels are composed of three well-qualified governmental and/or non-governmental 
individuals, who are not nationals of the parties or third parties to the dispute (Article 8.1 DSU). The ad 
                                                            
11 Pursuant to Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, panels and the Appellate Body interpret 
provisions of the covered agreements in accordance with the ordinary meaning of the words of the provision in their context 
and in light of the object and purpose of the agreement involved; and, if necessary and appropriate, they have recourse to 
supplementary means of interpretation. 
12 See e.g. in EC – Bananas III, Ecuador and in US – Gambling Antigua and Barbuda were authorized to retaliate by 
suspending obligations under the TRIPS Agreement vis-à-vis the European Union and the United States respectively. Neither 
country, however, made use of this possibility. In United States – Upland Cotton, Brazil was also authorized to retaliate by 
suspending obligations under the TRIPS Agreement vis-à-vis the United States and, in that case, the threat of such suspension, 
did have a significant impact on the resolution of the dispute. See below, p. ###. 
13 A decision is taken by reverse consensus unless there is a consensus among Members not to take the proposed decision. For 
example, a decision to establish a panel at the request of the complainant is taken by the DSB unless the latter decides by 
consensus not to establish the panel. It is clear that the complainant requesting the establishment of a panel is very unlikely to 
join the consensus not to establish the panel. 
14 See below, p. ##. 
 
         
hoc composition of panels allows for the appointment of panelists with specific expertise in the subject 
matter of the dispute concerned. In panels dealing with TRIPS disputes, some of the panelists thus clearly 
had extensive expertise in intellectual property law and were undoubtedly appointed for that reason.15 The 
task of the panel with regard to the disputed measure is to undertake neither a de novo review nor a 
deferential review, but ‘to make an objective assessment of the matter before it, including an objective 
assessment of the facts of the case and the applicability of and conformity with the relevant covered 
agreements’ (Article 11 DSU).  As the trier of facts, a panel must base its findings on a sufficient 
evidentiary basis on the record; must treat evidence in an ‘even-handed’ manner; and should not disregard 
evidence that is relevant to the case of one of the parties. Panels may exercise judicial economy; they 
need only address (but at the same time are required to address at least) those claims which must be 
addressed in order to resolve the matter at issue in the dispute. A panel report must, at a minimum, set out 
the findings of fact, the applicability of relevant provisions and the basic rationale behind any findings 
and recommendations it makes (Article 12.7 DSU). Where a panel concludes that a Member’s measure is 
inconsistent with WTO law, it shall recommend that the Member concerned bring that measure into 
conformity with WTO law (Article 19.1 DSU). The recommendations and rulings of the panel become 
legally binding when they are adopted – by reverse consensus – by the DSB. 
The Appellate Body is a permanent international tribunal of seven judges appointed by the DSB for a 
term of four years (renewable once) (Article 17. 1 and 2 DSU). The Appellate Body shall comprise 
‘persons of recognized authority, with demonstrated expertise in law, international trade and the subject 
matter of the covered agreements generally’ (Article 17.3 DSU). Note that of all judges who served on the 
Appellate Body to date, only one, Mr. A.V. Ganesan, had extensive prior expertise in international 
intellectual property law.16 Appellate Body members must be independent and impartial, avoid direct and 
indirect conflicts of interest and respect the confidentiality of proceedings (Article 17.3 DSU and Rules of 
Conduct for the DSU). The Appellate Body hears and decides appeals in divisions of three of its Members 
(Article 17.1 DSU). Only parties to the dispute can appeal a panel report (Article 17.4 DSU). An appeal is 
limited to issues of law covered in the panel report and legal interpretations developed by the panel 
(Article 17.6 DSU). Issues of fact cannot be appealed. However, the treatment of the facts or evidence by 
a panel may raise the question of whether the panel has made an objective assessment of the facts as 
required under Article 11 DSU. This is a legal issue and can therefore be examined by the Appellate 
Body. As explained below, this is, however, contested by the United States. The Appellate Body may 
uphold, modify or reverse the legal findings and conclusions of the panel that were appealed (Article 
17.13 DSU) On occasion, the Appellate Body has also – in the absence of the authority to remand a case 
to the panel – felt compelled to ‘complete the legal analysis’ on issues not addressed by the panel. It has 
done so in order to provide a prompt resolution of the dispute. 
The WTO dispute settlement process may – and often does – entail four major steps: (1) consultations; (2) 
panel proceedings; (3) appellate review proceedings; and (4) implementation and enforcement. The four-
step WTO dispute settlement process has six features that are particularly noteworthy, partly because they 
distinguish WTO dispute settlement – in both positive and negative ways – from other international 
dispute settlement mechanisms. These six features are: (1) the short time frame for each of the steps in the 
process; (2) the confidentiality and resulting lack of transparency of the process; (3) the burden of proof 
in WTO dispute settlement proceedings, which is on the party that asserts the affirmative of a particular 
claim or defence; (4) the important role of private legal counsel in representing parties in WTO dispute 
settlement; (5) the acceptance and consideration by panels and the Appellate Body of amicus curiae 
briefs; and (6) the obligation on Members to act in good faith in WTO dispute settlement proceedings, 
and the obligation on panels and the Appellate Body to ensure due process in these proceedings. Several 
of these procedural features have given raise to controversy. Most developing countries strongly object to 
the Appellate Body’s case law on the acceptance and consideration of amicus curiae briefs, and, as 
discussed below, the United States severely criticizes the Appellate Body for exceeding, without the 
                                                            
15 Note, however, that, as discussed below, disputes in which claims of inconsistency with the TRIPS Agreement were raised, 
often also concerned claims of inconsistency with other WTO agreements, and thus required panelists with broader expertise. 
16 Mr. A.V. Ganesan served as India’s chief negotiator on the TRIPS Agreement during the Uruguay Round. 
 
         
agreement of the parties, the mandatory, but often totally unrealistic, 90-day timeframe for appellate 
review. 
Performance of the WTO Dispute Settlement System in TRIPS Disputes  
Overall, the WTO system for resolving trade disputes between WTO Members has been a remarkable 
success. In1996, Director-General Renato Ruggiero referred to the WTO dispute settlement system as the 
‘jewel in the crown’ of the WTO. Such praise was in this second year of the system probably premature, 
but it would soon, and this for many years, prove to be justified. Between 1995 and 2019, 593 disputes 
were brought to the WTO for resolution.17 While the United States and the European Union were the 
most frequent complainants, developing-country Members made frequent use of the WTO dispute 
settlement system to challenge the WTO consistency of trade measures of other Members. In a number of 
years developing-country Members brought more disputes to the WTO than developed-country 
Members.18 The United States and the European Union have not only been the most frequent 
complainants, they were also more than any other Member respondents, albeit that the European Union is 
in this respect a distant second. The rate of compliance with rulings of WTO dispute settlement panels 
and the Appellate Body has been consistently very high Note, however, that the United States has 
consistently failed to comply with a number of rulings which required it to withdraw or amend WTO-
inconsistent measures. 
Of the 593 disputes brought to the WTO between 1995 and 2019, i.e. of the disputes in which 
consultations between the parties were initiated during this period, 41, or 7 per cent, concerned 
obligations under the TRIPS Agreement.19 The United States was by far the most frequent complainant in 
TRIPS disputes (18), followed by the European Union (8). The United States initiated almost 50 per cent 
of all TRIPS dispute proceedings. Other WTO Members were complainant in TRIPS disputes only once 
or twice. The European Union (7) was more than any other Member the respondent in TRIPS disputes, 
followed by Australia (5) and the United States (4). Contrary to what developing country Members had 
feared, there was definitely no tsunami of TRIPS disputes brought to the WTO by developed country 
Members against developed country Members. In fact, in only 13 of the 41 disputes the respondents were 
developing country Members.20 Most TRIPS disputes were initiated in the early years of the WTO, i.e. in 
the period from 1996 to 2000 (23) but there was a recent peak in the years 2017-2019 (8). The TRIPS 
provisions most as issue in the disputes in which consultations were initiated concerned (in order of 
importance) the domestic enforcement of IPRs, patents, trademarks, copyright and the national treatment 
obligation. Note the relatively low number of TRIPS disputes brought to the WTO (7 per cent of all WTO 
disputes). It has been suggested that some of the core features of WTO dispute settlement explain this 
relatively low number of TRIPS disputes brought to the WTO for resolution.21 As discussed above, only 
WTO Members, and not the IP holders themselves,  can bring a TRIPS dispute to the WTO, and while IP 
holders may be successful in lobbying a WTO Member to do so, their efforts in this respect are often 
likely to fail. Also, only measures by a WTO Member (or measures attributable to it) can be challenged in 
WTO dispute settlement. IP infringements by private operators cannot, whereas these infringements are 
probably what IP holders are most concerned about. Moreover, the remedies available under the DSU 
                                                            
17 See http://worldtradelaw.net/databases/searchcomplaints.php. To date, only two disputes were brought to the WTO in 2020. 
See ibid. 
18 See http://worldtradelaw.net/databases/complaintsclassification.php.  
19 For data on the consultations initiated between January 1995 and December 2019, see 
http://worldtradelaw.net/databases/searchcomplaints.php.  Note that none of the consultations initiated in 2020 concerned 
TRIPS matters. See ibid. 
20 China (3), Indonesia (2), Argentina (2), India (2), Pakistan (1), Turkey (1), Cuba (1), and Brazil (1). 
21 See e.g. J. Pauwelyn, ‘The Dog that Barked But Didn’t Bite: 15 Years of Intellectual Property Disputes at the WTO’ 
(November 2010), available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1708026.  
 
         
offer little comfort to the winning complainant, as these remedies are only prospective. Past economic 
harm caused to the IP holder as a result of a TRIPS-inconsistent measure is not compensated. Future 
economic harm can be compensated but such compensation is of little interest to IP holders because is 
normally is in the form of a reduction of trade barriers on other products or services. In only one TRIPS 
dispute, US – Section 110(5) Copyright Act, the United States paid the European Union, the complainant 
(and thus presumably the EU IP holders) for a period of three years € 1.2 million per year, as 
compensation for its continuing non-compliance with the ruling in this case. Such award of monetary 
compensation is, however, very exceptional. As discussed below, also the retaliation measures which a 
complainant may be authorized to take vis-à-vis a respondent who fails to comply with a ruling, is of little 
help to the IP holder. Finally, note that in practice WTO dispute settlement proceedings, while short in 
comparison with the proceedings of other international courts and tribunals, may take too much time for 
IP holders to be an attractive response to specific instances of breach of TRIPS obligations. 
In addition to the relatively low number of TRIPS disputes brought to the WTO for resolution, one should 
note that in 45 per cent of these disputes, consultations were ‘successful’ in the sense that the dispute did 
not proceed to the next stage in the WTO dispute settlement process, namely panel proceedings.22 This 
may be because the complainant and the respondent reach a mutually agreed solution to the dispute or 
because the complainant (and/or the IP holders who initially lobbying for proceedings to be initiated) 
decide not to pursue the case further. Note that this percentage of ‘successful’ consultations (45 per cent) 
is significantly higher than the overall ‘success’ rate of consultations (20 per cent). In addition of the 
reasons already mentioned above for the low number for TRIPS disputes, the high rate of successful 
consultations may also be explained by the fact that in a number of TRIPS disputes the TRIPS obligations 
were very clear and the TRIPS-inconsistency quite obvious. In those disputes, the initiation of formal 
consultations by the complainant was all what the respondent needed as ‘encouragement’ to either 
withdraw or modify the TRIPS-consistent measure.  
To date, the TRIPS disputes, which did proceed to the panel stage, resulted in 13 panel reports.23 In total, 
WTO disputes resulted between 1995 and 2019 in 258 panel reports. Only 5 per cent of these reports 
concerns TRIPS disputes. Not surprisingly the United States (6) and the European Union (4) were most 
frequently the complainants in disputes that resulted in panel reports. The most frequent respondents were 
the United States and Australia (each 4) and China, India and the European Union (each 2).24 Most of the 
13 panel reports were issued in the period between 1998 and 2000 (7). There are currently 2 TRIPS 
disputes pending before a panel.25 The TRIPS provisions most at issue in panel reports concerned (in 
order of importance) trademarks, the national treatment obligation, geographical indications, and the 
enforcement of IPRs.  
                                                            
22 See http://worldtradelaw.net/databases/searchcomplaints.php and http://worldtradelaw.net/databases/wtopanels.php.  
23 In reverse chronological order: Saudi Arabia – IPR (DS567)(complaint by Qatar); Australia – Tobacco Plain Packaging 
(DS435, DS441) (complaints by Honduras and Dominican Republic); Australia – Tobacco Plain Packaging (DS458, DS467)  
(complaints by Cuba and Indonesia); China – IP Rights (DS362) (complaint by the United States); EC – Trademarks and 
Geographical Indications (DS290) (complaint by Australia); EC – Trademarks and Geographical Indications (DS174) 
(complaints by the United States); US – Section 211 Appropriations Act (‘Havana Club’) (DS176) (complaint by the European 
Communities); US – Section 110(5) Copyright Act (DS160) (complaint by the European Communities); Canada – Patent Term 
(DS170) (complaint by the United States); Canada – Pharmaceuticals Patents (DS114) (complaint by the European 
Communities); India – Patents (DS79) (complaints by the European Communities); Indonesia – Autos (DS54, DS55, DS59, 
DS64) (complaints by European Communities, Japan and the United States); and India – Patents (DS50) (complaint by the 
United States). 
24 Note that the numbers between brackets refer to the number of disputes which resulted in panel reports, not to the number of panel 
reports.  
25 UAE – Trade in Goods and Services, and IP (DS533) (complaint by Qatar) and China – IP Rights (DS542) (complaint by the 
United States). 
 
         
Of the 13 panel reports in TRIPS disputes circulated to date, 4 were appealed to the Appellate Body and 
resulted in Appellate Body reports.26 The appeal rate of 41 per cent is considerably lower than the normal 
appeal rate of 68 per cent.27 Only 2 per cent of the 145 Appellate Body reports circulated to date 
concerned TRIPS disputes.28 The Appellate Body has had very few occasions to clarify TRIPS provisions 
pursuant its mandate under Article 3.2 DSU. The TRIPS provisions at issue in these Appellate Body 
reports concerned trademarks, patents, the enforcement of IPR, and the protection of existing subject 
matter. It has been suggested that for the low appeal rate of panel reports is that TRIPS panels, more than 
other panels ‘carefully balanced giving something to each side which neither side was willing to risk on 
appeal’ and that ‘parties may also be apprehensive of involving the Appellate Body whose rulings … 
carry more weight and set a deeper precedent than panels’.29 
As regards the implementation of, and compliance with, panel and/or Appellate Body rulings, the 
reasonable period of time for implementation could not be agreed upon by the parties and was set by an 
arbitrator in three TRIPS disputes.30 As already discussed above, in one TRIPS dispute, the level of 
compensation for future harm caused by the TRIPS-inconsistent measure was determined by arbitration 
under Article 25 DSU, and to date this has been the only use ever made of Article 25 DSU.31 DSB 
authorisation to retaliate because the respondent failed to comply, was requested in that same dispute, but 
this request was subsequently not further pursued in spite of the continued failure to comply. In this and 
one other TRIPS dispute, there was been long-standing failure to comply with the rulings and 
recommendations of the panel and the Appellate Body.32. In both disputes the United States was the 
respondent failing to comply.  
In sum, while some WTO Members have often claimed that other Members systematically act 
inconsistently with their obligations under the TRIPS Agreement, compared to other WTO agreements, 
few TRIPS disputes were brought to the WTO and when they were brought, they were more often than 
other WTO disputes not pursued to the end. More use of the WTO dispute settlement system would have 
allowed for the rules-based resolution of specific TRIPS disputes between WTO Members, rather than see 
these disputes fester, be politicized and affect negatively the relations between the Members concerned. 
More of the WTO dispute settlement system would also have allowed for the clarification of existing 
TRIPS provisions and this for the development of WTO intellectual property law. While the WTO 
dispute settlement system definitely made a more significant contribution to the development of the law 
of WTO agreements other than the TRIPS Agreement, this does not mean that the WTO dispute 
settlement had no impact on the development of WTO IP law over the past 25 years. Among the disputes 
noteworthy here are India – Patents (DS50) (1998), Canada – Patent Term (DS170), US – Section 
211Appropriation Act (‘Havana Club’) (DS 176), EC – Trademarks and Geograhical Indications 
                                                            
26 In reverse chronological order: Australia – Tobacco Plain Packaging (DS435, DS441)  (complaints by Honduras and Dominican 
Republic); US – Section 211 Appropriations Act (‘Havana Club’) (DS176) (complaint by the European Communities); Canada – 
Patent Term (DS170) (complaint by the United States); Canada – Pharmaceuticals Patents (DS114) (complaint by the European 
Communities); and India – Patents (DS79) (complaints by the European Communities). It is at present unclear whether the panel 
report in Saudi Arabia – IPR (DS567)(complaint by Qatar), which was circulated on 16 June 2020, will be appealed. 
27 See http://worldtradelaw.net/databases/appealcount.php.  
28 See http://worldtradelaw.net/databases/abreports.php.  
29 J. Pauwelyn, op.cit., p. 44. 
30 In reverse chronological order: US – Section 110(5) Copyright Act (DS160) (complaint by the European Communities) (reasonable 
period of time for implementation: 12 months); Canada – Patent Term (DS170) (complaint by the United States) (reasonable period 
of time for implementation: 10 months); Canada – Pharmaceuticals Patents (DS114) (complaint by the European Communities) 
(reasonable period of time for implementation: 6 months). See http://worldtradelaw.net/databases/rptawards.php.  
31 In US – Section 110(5) Copyright Act (DS160) (complaint by the European Communities), the arbitrator determined the 
compensation required to be € 1.2 million per year. As noted above, the United States paid the European Communities this amount for 
three years and then halted the payments without having complied with the rulings in this case. 
32 US – Section 211 Appropriations Act (‘Havana Club’) (DS176) (complaint by the European Communities); and US – Section 
110(5) Copyright Act (DS160) (complaint by the European Communities). 
 
         
(DS174, DS290), China – IP Rights (DS362), and Australia – Tobacco Plain Packaging (DS435, DS441, 
DS458, DS467). 
The Crisis of WTO Dispute Settlement 
As noted above, the WTO dispute settlement system is currently in crisis, but while this crisis is now 
acute and existential, it has been looming for many years. Even during the early years of WTO dispute 
settlement, there were a number of crisis moments, for example in 1997 in the context of the US – Helms 
Burton dispute regarding the jurisdiction over disputes in which national security was invoked; in 1999 in 
the context of the EC – Bananas III dispute regarding the sequencing of the Article 21.5 DSU compliance 
procedure and the Article 22.6 DSU procedure for DSB authorization for retaliation; and in 2001 in the 
context of the EC – Asbestos dispute regarding the acceptance and consideration of amicus curiae 
briefs.33 Also, in the context of the DSU review (1998-1999) and the DSU reform negotiations in the 
context of the Doha Round negotiations (2001-), WTO Members, while expressing general satisfaction 
with the WTO dispute settlement system, tabled dozens of proposals for change.34 As from 2005 
onwards, the WTO dispute settlement system became gradually ever more the victim of its own success. 
First, the dispute settlement workload grew steadily, in particular due to the increasing number of claims 
of inconsistency raised in each dispute and the rising complexity of the measures challenged and the legal 
arguments made. However, the resources made available did not keep track with this growing workload. 
Second, the institutional imbalance between the successful judicial branch of the WTO and its mostly 
ineffective legislative branch became ever more apparent and made WTO Member seek changes to WTO 
law through litigation rather than negotiation. This development brought with it the perception of, if not 
the danger of, judicial activism by WTO panels and, in particular, the Appellate Body. Third, certainly 
since 2010, some WTO Members, and in particular the United States, adopted an ever more antagonistic 
discourse against the Appellate Body whenever the latter’s rulings were unfavourable. Fourth, some 
WTO Members, and again in particular the United States, undermined the independence and impartiality 
of WTO adjudicators by inter alia blocking the  reappointment of Appellate Body members who were 
seen as not having ‘served’ US interests sufficiently (Jennifer Hillman of the United States in 2012) or 
were seen as having ruled against the United States (Seung Shang of Korea in 2016). The current crisis of 
the WTO dispute settlement system was thus already looming for some time. 
It was, however, only under the Trump Administration that the crisis of WTO dispute settlement became 
acute. As from the summer of 2017, the United States has obstructed the process of appointment or re-
appointment of Appellate Body members because, as it repeatedly stated, it has serious ‘concerns’ 
regarding the functioning of the Appellate Body. The United States accuses the Appellate Body of 
judicial overreach as well as blatant disregard for its procedural and institutional rules.35 As to the alleged 
judicial overreach, the United States accuses the Appellate Body, first, of judicial activism, i.e. of 
creating, through erroneous interpretations of WTO provisions, obligations the United States had never 
agreed to; second, of rendering advisory opinions in that the Appellate Body ruled on issues that were not 
necessary to rule upon to resolve the dispute at hand; third, of reviewing factual findings of the panel and 
                                                            
33 See P. Van den Bossche & W. Zdouc, The Law and Policy of the World Trade Organization, 4th edition (Cambridge 
University Press, 2017), pp. 622, 290-1, and 260-4. 
34 See ibid., pp. 294-6. 
35 See US President's 2018 Trade Policy Agenda, p. 22 ff, at  https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/reports-and-
publications/2018/2018-trade-policy-agenda-and-2017; and United States Trade Representative, Report on the Appellate Body 
of the World Trade Organization, February 2020, at 
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/Report_on_the_Appellate_Body_of_the_World_Trade_Organization.pdf. See also the 
statement by the United States at the DSB meetings on 22 June 2018 concerning Article 17.5 DSU and the 90-day timeframe 
for appellate review, on 27 August and 26 September 2018 concerning Article 17.6 DSU and appellate review of panel 
findings of fact, including on the meaning of domestic law; and on 29 October 2018 concerning the issuance of advisory 
opinions on issues not necessary to resolve a dispute. 
 
         
in particular findings on the meaning of domestic law, which fall outside the Appellate Body’s mandate 
under Article 17.6 DSU; and fourth, of considering its case law as having binding precedential value. As 
to the alleged disregard for procedural and institutional rules, the United States objects in particular to the 
Appellate Body exceeding the mandatory 90-day timeframe for appellate review without the explicit 
agreement of the parties, and to allowing, pursuant to Rule 15 of the Working Procedures for Appellate 
Review, out-going Appellate Body members to complete the disposition of appeals which were assigned 
to them before the end of their term in office. With the exception of the last concern, the United States 
had also under the Obama and George W. Bush Administrations voiced the same or very similar concerns 
regarding the functioning of the Appellate Body. However, the Trump Administration, by blocking the 
(re-)appointment of Appellate Body judges, transformed these ‘concerns’ into an existential crisis of the 
Appellate Body. On 11 December 2019, the number of Appellate Body judges in office fell below the 
minimum of three. Of the seven Appellate Body judges in mid-2017, only Ms. ZHAO Hong of China was 
left, after the terms of Amb. Ujal Bhatia Singh of India and Mr. Thomas Graham of the United States had 
come to an end. As from 11 December 2019, the Appellate Body could no longer hear any new appeals 
and of the 12 appeals pending at that time, it was only allowed to complete the disposition in three.36 The 
paralysis of the Appellate Body severely undermines the whole WTO dispute settlement system as it may 
be expected that parties losing a case at the panel stage will appeal the unfavourable panel report to the 
paralysed Appellate Body – an action referred to as appealing into the void – and will thus prevent the 
panel report from being adopted by the DSB and becoming legally binding. For almost 25 years, the 
WTO dispute settlement system was a glorious experiment with the rule of law in international trade 
relations. Unless an agreement is reached on how to address the United States’ concerns regarding the 
functioning of the Appellate Body, this experiment has sadly come to an end. In search of such 
agreement, no less than 22 WTO Members and the African Group have, since November 2018,  tabled, 
either individually or jointly, position papers with proposals to address the US concerns regarding the 
functioning of the Appellate Body.37 Some of these position papers, such as the Communication from the 
European Union, China, Canada, India, Norway, New Zealand, Switzerland, Australia, the Republic of 
Korea, Iceland, Singapore, Mexico and Montenegro of 10 December 2019, were rather ‘skeptical’ about 
the legitimacy of the concerns raised by the United States and made proposals which safeguarded the key 
features of WTO appellate review.38 Other position papers, such as the Communication from Brazil, 
                                                            
36 The disposition of these three appeals was completed pursuant Rule 15 of the Working Procedures of Appellate Review. The 
Appellate Body Report in the last of these three appeals, Australia — Tobacco Plain Packaging (DS435 and DS441), was 
circulated on 9 June 2020. As discussed above, this report addressed inter alia a number of TRIPS issues. 
37 See Communication from the European Union, China, Canada, India, Norway, New Zealand, Switzerland, Australia, 
Republic of Korea, Iceland, Singapore and Mexico and Montenegro to the General Council, WT/GC/W/752/Rev. 2, dated 11 
December 2018; Communication from the European Union, China, India and Montenegro to the General Council, 
WT/GC/W/753, dated 26 November 2018 and WT/GC/W/753/Rev., dated 11December 2018; Communications from 
Honduras to the General Council, , WT/GC/W/758, dated 21 January 2019, WT/GC/W/759, dated 21 January 2019, 
WT/GC/W/760, dated 29 January 2019, and WT/GC/W/761, dated 4 February 2019; Communication from the Separate, 
Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu to the General Council, WT/GC/W/763 Rev., dated 8 April 2019; 
Communication from Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay to the General Council, WT/GC/W/767/Rev. dated 25 April 2019; 
Communication from Japan, Australia and Chile to the General Council, WT/GC/W/768, dated 18 April 2019, and 
WT/GC/W/768/Rev., dated 26 April 2019; Communication from Thailand to the General Council, WT/GC/W/769, dated 26 
April 2019; and Communication from the African Group to the General Council, WT/GC/W/776, dated 26 June 2019. See 
also, more generally, European Commission, Concept Paper on WTO Modernisation, Part 3 on Future EU Proposals on 
Dispute Settlement, dated 20 September 2018; and Communication from Canada, Strengthening and Modernizing the WTO: 
Discussion Paper, Theme 2: Safeguarding and Strengthening WTO Dispute Settlement, JOB/GC/201, dated 21 September 
2018. 
38 On the US reaction to the Communication from the EU, China, Canada, India and others, see Statements by the United 
States at the Meeting of the WTO General Council on 12 December 2018 (agenda items 7 and 8). 
 
         
Paraguay and Uruguay of 25 April 2019 was much more sympathetic to the US concerns and altered 
some key features of WTO appellate review. Almost all WTO Members were, and still are, of the view 
that whatever legitimate concerns the United States might have regarding the functioning of the Appellate 
Body, these concerns did not justify the obstruction of the appointment process, which resulted in the 
paralysis of the Appellate Body and the undermining of the whole WTO dispute settlement system. WTO 
Members repeatedly, and in growing numbers, called upon the United States to allow for the appointment 
of new Appellate Body Members. At the meeting of the DSB on 29 June 2020, 122 WTO Members 
called on the DSB to take immediately the decision to unblock the appointment process.39  
In December 2018, the WTO General Council appointed Amb. David Walker of New Zealand as 
‘Facilitator’ to resolve the differences among WTO Members on the functioning of the Appellate Body in 
order to allow for the unblocking of the appointment process.40 Over the next 10 months, Amb. Walker, 
who was also elected as DSB Chair in early 2019, met with WTO Members, in small groups and in open-
ended informal meetings to discuss the proposals for reform tabled and seek a way out of this crisis. The 
United States, however, did not table any reform proposal and, reportedly, did not even engaged in the 
discussions but only sent a junior diplomat to take notes. Based on the proposals made by Members and 
the extensive discussions on these proposals, Amb. Walker submitted on 15 October 2019 to the General 
Council a Draft Decision on the Functioning of the Appellate Body. 41  This Draft Decision aimed at 
‘seeking workable and agreeable solutions to improve the functioning of the Appellate Body’, in the hope 
to avoid the paralysis of the Appellate Body as from December 2019.42 The Draft Decision inter alia 
addressed: (1) the US concern regarding judicial activism, by stating that pursuant to Articles 3.2 and 19.2 
DSU, Appellate Body rulings ‘cannot add to or diminish the rights and obligations provided in the 
covered agreements; (2) the US concern regarding binding precedent, by stating that precedent is ‘not 
created through WTO dispute settlement proceedings’, but that consistency and predictability in the 
interpretation of WTO law is ‘of significant value to Members’; (3) the US concern regarding advisory 
opinions rendered by the Appellate Body, by stating that the latter may only address issues raised by the 
parties to the extent necessary to resolve the dispute; (4) the US concern regarding appellate review of 
findings on the meaning of municipal law, by stating that the meaning of municipal law is to treated as a 
matter of fact and therefore, pursuant to Article 17.6 DSU, not subject to appellate review; (5) the US 
concern regarding the 90-day timeframe for appellate review, by stating that, pursuant to Article 17.5 
DSU, the Appellate Body is obligated to issue its report within 90 days of the notice of appeal and that 
this timeframe can only be extended with the agreement of the parties; and (6) the US concern regarding 
the Rule 15 of the Working Procedures for Appellate Review, by deciding that only the DSB can 
authorize outgoing Appellate Body members to complete the disposition of an appeal after the expiry of  
their term in office, if and when the oral hearing in the appeal took place prior to the expiry. The Draft 
Decision was a carefully constructed compromise between the Members engaged in the discussions on 
the functioning of the Appellate Body, which preserved the core features of the WTO appellate review. 
However, the hope that the Draft Decision would allow the WTO to avoid the paralysis of the Appellate 
Body as from 11 December 2019 was very short-lived. On the same day as the Draft Decision was 
submitted, the United States rejected most of the ‘solutions’ reflected in the Draft Decision. According to 
the United States, there was no agreement on how to ensure that the limitations imposed by the DSU on 
                                                            
https://geneva.usmission.gov/2018/12/12/statements-items-7-and-8-by-the-united-states-at-the-meeting-of-the-wto-general-
council/. 
39 See Proposal on Appellate Body Appointments, WT/DSB/W/609/Rev. 18, dated 19 June 2020. 
40 See https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news19_e/gc_18jan19_e.htm. 
41 General Council, Informal Process on Matters related to the Functioning of the Appellate Body – Report by the Facilitator, 
H.E. Dr. David Walker (New Zealand), JOB/GC/222, dated 15 October 2019, Annex. 
42 Ibid., para. 1.22 
 
         
the Appellate Body are respected in the future and what the consequences are for continued failure to 
adhere to these limitations.43 Subsequently, the impasse was complete and the paralysis of the Appellate 
Body on 11 December 2019 unavoidable. At the meeting of the General Council on 3 March 2020, Amb. 
Dennis Shea of the United States declared that by failing repeatedly to interpret the WTO agreements 
consistent with the text of those agreements, ‘the Appellate Body has undermined a rules-based trading 
system by persistently breaking those rules’.44 Amb. Shea emphasized again that the United States has 
been raising its concerns regarding the functioning of the Appellate Body for many years, but that the 
problem ‘has only worsened as too many WTO Members have remained unwilling to do anything to rein 
in’ the Appellate Body’s disregard for WTO rules.45 According to the United States, the current crisis can 
only be overcome and reform of the WTO dispute settlement system achieved, if WTO Members 
recognize and ‘come to terms with the failings of the Appellate Body’.46 The United States insists that 
WTO Members ‘engage in a deeper discussion of the why the Appellate Body has felt free to depart from 
the role Members assigned to it’.47 However, many other Members, including the European Union, China, 
India and Canada, disagree that the Appellate Body systematically engaged in judicial overreach and 
demonstrated intentional disregard for procedural and institutional rules.48 At the General Council 
meeting of 9 December 2019, two days before the Appellate Body became paralyzed, Amb. Joao Aguiar 
Machado of the European Union stated that ‘the EU wishes to emphasise that [the Appellate Body] has 
served well all Members in an independent, highly professional and, given the circumstances, very 
efficient manner. The European Union, therefore, would like to commend all the present and past 
members of the Appellate Body on their work, as well as the staff working on the Appellate Body’s 
secretariat’.49 The United States’ position on the functioning of the Appellate Body reflects: (1) its strong 
and ideologically-charged disagreement with Appellate Body case law which restricts the ability of the 
United States to protect its domestic industry from import competition; and (2) its wish to return to a pre-
WTO situation in which it could use its economic and other power to ‘resolve’ trade disputes with trading 
partners. On 17 June 2020, during briefings to the US House Ways and Means Committee and Senate 
Finance Committee, Amb. Robert Lighthizer, the United States Trade Representative, reportedly said that 
‘he would be content if the AB is never restored, arguing that the WTO members need to talk about a new 
                                                            
43 Statement by Amb. Dennis Shea (United States) at the WTO General Council meeting on 15 and 16 October 2019 on 
Informal Process on Matters Related to the Functioning of the Appellate Body – Report by the Facilitator 
https://geneva.usmission.gov/2019/10/15/statements-by-the-united-states-at-the-wto-general-council-meeting/. 
44 Statement by Amb. Dennis Shea (United States) at the WTO General Council meeting on 3 March 2020 on the USTR 
Report on the Appellate Body of the World Trade Organization (item 11), 
https://geneva.usmission.gov/2020/03/03/statements-by-ambassador-dennis-shea-at-the-march-3-2020-general-council-
meeting/.  
45 Ibid. 
46 Ibid. 
47 Ibid. 
48 See e.g. Statement by Amb. Joao Aguiar Machado (European Union) at the WTO General Council meeting on 15 and 16 
October 2019 on Informal Process on Matters Related to the Functioning of the Appellate Body – Report by the Facilitator 
https://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/world-trade-organization-wto/68955/eu-statement-ambassador-jo%C3%A3o-aguiar-
machado-general-council-meeting-15-and-16-october-2019_en; and Statement by Amb. ZHANG Xiangchen (China) at the 
WTO General Council meeting on 15 & 16 October 2019 on Informal Process on Matters Related to the Functioning of the 
Appellate Body – Report by the Facilitator 
http://wto2.mofcom.gov.cn/article/chinaviewpoins/201910/20191002905004.shtml. 
49 Statement by Amb. Joao Aguiar Machado (European Union) at the WTO General Council meeting on 9 December 2019 on 
Informal Process on Matters Related to the Functioning of the Appellate Body – Report by the Facilitator and Draft Decision 
on the Functioning of the Appellate Body, WT/GC/W/791, item 11, https://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/world-trade-
organization-wto/71695/eu-statement-ambassador-joão-aguiar-machado-general-council-meeting-9-december-
2019_en?utm_source=dlvr.it&utm_medium=twitter  
 
         
dispute settlement system’ and that ‘he believes the original (GATT) non-binding system that encouraged 
countries to work out their disputes was better’.50 Amb. Lighthizer seems unwilling to recognize that the 
WTO dispute settlement system was established because the GATT dispute settlement system no longer 
worked as from the late 80s and that the United States’ recourse at that time to unilateral, power-based 
‘resolution’ of trade disputes was  already, when the United States was in all respects still a much more 
powerful nation, unacceptable to its trading partners and detrimental to international trade relations. 
On 24 January 2020, in the margin of the 2020 World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, the 
ministers of 17 WTO Members announced that, while they remain committed to finding a solution to the 
Appellate Body crisis, they would work together ‘towards putting in place contingency measures that 
would allow for appeals of WTO panel reports in disputes among themselves’.51 They instructed their 
officials to ‘expeditiously finalise work’ on a multi-party arrangement for appeal arbitration under Article 
25 DSU. In 2019, the European Union had already made bilateral arrangements for appeal arbitration 
under Article 25 DSU with Canada and Norway, under which former Appellate Body members would act 
as appellate arbitrators.52 Article 25 DSU provides  for ‘expeditious arbitration within the WTO as an 
alternative means of dispute settlement’ and had been resorted to but once since 1995.53 Probably faster 
than anyone had expected, but clearly reflecting the desire to preserve a credible WTO dispute settlement 
system, 16 WTO Members announced on 27 March 2020 that they had reached an agreement on the 
Multi-Party Interim Appeal Arbitration Arrangement under Article 25 of the DSU (MPIA), which became 
effective on 30 April 2020, when it was notified to the DSB.54 The MPIA is a valiant attempt to save what 
can be saved of the WTO dispute settlement system. However, it is but, and should not be more than, a 
temporary substitute for appellate review by the Appellate Body. At present, 21 WTO Members are a 
party to the MPIA, including Brazil, Canada, China, the European Union and Mexico, i.e. five of the ten 
most frequent users of the WTO dispute settlement system. The number of parties to the MPIA is 
expected to increase further and it should be noted that also WTO Members who are not MPIA parties 
may resort on an ad hoc basis to appeal arbitration under the MPIA. Parties to the MPIA agree not to 
appeal panel reports to the paralyzed Appellate Body (i.e., agree not to appeal panel reports into the void), 
but will resort to appellate arbitration under Article 25 DSU. The MPIA appeals will be heard by three 
arbitrators randomly selected from a fixed pool of 10 arbitrators. To the extent that the procedures 
followed under the MPIA will mimic appellate review by the Appellate Body – and that is the stated 
intention – the MPIA may serve the parties thereto well as long as the Appellate Body is paralyzed. The 
nominations made for the pool of MPIA arbitrators justify this hope. However, it remains to be seen how 
the MPIA will work in practice. On 3 June 2020, Australia and Canada in Canada – Sale of Wine (DS 
537), Mexico and Costa Rica in Costa Rica – Advocados (DS524), and Brazil and Canada in Canada – 
Aircraft (DS522) notified the DSB that they have agreed – under the MPIA – to Procedures for 
Arbitration under Article 25 DSU.55 However, on 5 June 2020, the United States reportedly wrote to DG 
Acevêdo objecting to the MPIA, which was referred to as a ‘China-EU arrangement’ and was said to 
create an ‘ersatz’ Appellate Body ‘exacerbating the erroneous WTO appellate practice rather than 
                                                            
50 See Washington Trade Daily, 18 June 2020, www.washingtontradedaily.net.  
51 See https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2020/january/tradoc_158596.pdf.  
52 See for the EU/Canada Arrangement, https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2019/july/tradoc_158273.pdf, and for the 
EU/Norway Arrangement, https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2019/october/tradoc_158394.pdf  
53 See Award of the Arbitrators, US – Section 110(5) Copyright Act (Article 25), circulated 9 November 2001, referred to 
above. 
54 Statement on a Mechanism for Developing, documenting and Sharing Practices and Procedures in the Conduct of WTO 
Disputes, Addendum, JOB/DSB/1/Add. 12, dated 30 April 2020, 
https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2020/april/tradoc_158731.pdf.  Note that the 17 WTO Members which in January 2020 
committed themselves to working towards an appeal arbitration arrangement, only Korea did not, and still is not, a party to the 
MPIA. 
55 See e.g. WT/DS537/15, dated 3 June 2020. 
 
         
reforming it’. According to the United States, the WTO Members that are parties to the MPIA have no 
right to use any WTO financial or staff resources on arbitration under the MPIA or instruct the Director-
General to do so.56  
Impact of WTO Dispute Settlement Crisis on the TRIPS Agreement 
To date, the United States has not raised any of its concerns regarding the Appellate Body, whether 
regarding the latter’s judicial overreach or its disregard for procedural and institutional rules, in the 
context of Appellate Body reports which dealt with TRIPS issues.57 As noted above, the Appellate Body 
has circulated since 1995, reports dealing with TRIPS issues in a mere four disputes. In two of these 
disputes, the United States was the complainant: India – Patents (1998) and Canada – Patent Terms 
(2000). In both cases, the Appellate Body found in favour of the United States and the latter therefore 
obviously did consider the Appellate Body to be guilty of any form of judicial overreach. The Appellate 
Body was also able to complete the appellate review proceedings in these relatively small appeals within 
the mandatory 90-day timeframe.58 In a third dispute, the United States was the respondent: US – Section 
211 Appropriation Act (‘Havana Club’) (2002), and while the Appellate Body ruled on a number of 
claims against the United States, the latter has not included these rulings in its list of examples of judicial 
overreach.59 This report was circulated on day 90. In the fourth dispute in which the Appellate Body 
circulated a report dealing with TRIPS issues, Australia – Tobacco Plain Packaging, circulated on 9 June 
2020, the United States was not a party, but, as one might expect an active third party. As this Appellate 
Body report has not yet been discussed in the DSB, it remains to be seen how the United States will 
respond to this report and whether it will raise any of its concerns regarding the functioning of the 
Appellate Body. The appellate review proceedings in that case took 691 days, rather than 90 days, and the 
parties were not asked for their agreement to exceed the mandatory 90-day timeframe. 
The fact that the United States has, to date, not explicitly raised concerns regarding Appellate Body 
reports addressing TRIPS issues is, however, of little importance to TRIPS dispute resolution. In the 
absence of a fully functional WTO dispute settlement system, TRIPS disputes may remain unresolved, 
may fester, and may trigger unilateral retaliation of WTO Members adversely affected by the alleged 
TRIPS-inconsistent measures. Also, in the absence of a fully functional dispute settlement system and, in 
particular, in the absence of an active Appellate Body, there will be no further clarification of TRIPS 
provision, and thus no further development of WTO IP law, through adjudication. The long-term impact 
of the crisis of the WTO settlement system will be for the WTO IP law no less harmful than for other 
fields of WTO law. 
 
                                                            
56 See also Bryce Baschuk, U.S. Pledges to Block Funding for EU’s WTO Appellate Body Proxy, Bloomberg Law, 12 June 
2020, https://news.bloomberglaw.com/international-trade/u-s-pledges-to-block-funding-for-eus-wto-appellate-body-proxy  
57 It may still do so with regard to the Appellate Body report in Australia – Tobacco Plain Packaging, which was circulated on 
9 June 2020. 
58 Note that the Appellate Body report in India – Patents (1998) was circulated 65 days after the notice of appeal. 
59 See United States Trade Representative, Report on the Appellate Body of the World Trade Organization, February 2020, at 
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/Report_on_the_Appellate_Body_of_the_World_Trade_Organization.pdf. 
